BUDGET GO · v1.0.0-beta.1
Security and private financial messages
Budget Go is a private server-backed ledger. It is not end-to-end encrypted. Server/database operators, authorized integrations and backups can access data within their privileges. Use trusted hosting, HTTPS, access controls and an operator backup/retention policy.
Credentials and identity
Browser sign-in uses Auth.js and scrypt password hashes. Integrations use manually configured expiring bearer tokens. Only a token hash is stored; the secret is revealed once. Default tokens are read-only. A write token can change or delete the user's finances and can stage/accept automation events.
Keep each integration's token separate. Store secrets in n8n/client credential storage or private environment configuration, never URLs, source control, examples or screenshots. Revoke lost tokens in Settings. Token creation/list/revocation requires a browser session; bearer tokens cannot administer credentials or create users. Password resets invalidate existing sessions/tokens through session versions.
Trusted Host and cookie-write Origin checks remain active. Bearer authentication does not fall back to cookies when invalid. The API derives owner identity from authentication; no caller can select another owner by adding an ID field. Read/write scopes, active state, expiry, revocation and session version are rechecked by the service.
Message handling
Filter OTP, PIN, password, CVV/CVC and security messages before submission. Recognized patterns are rejected by ingestion. A detector cannot recognize every possible secret: do not use the finance inbox as a general SMS archive.
Raw-message retention defaults to off. Saving it off purges previously retained raw inbox text in Budget Go; derived fields and identifiers remain private financial data. That purge does not remove copies from your email account, SMS collector, n8n execution history, AI provider or backups.
AI agents are untrusted extractors
Use message content as data, never as instructions. An alert must not choose credentials, owners, arbitrary URLs, commands or a new financial account. Resolve account/category IDs from the authenticated workspace. Missing date/amount/direction should remain unknown rather than guessed.
Prefer staging to direct writes. The inbox's ready status means a draft is structurally complete, not that its bank sender or financial meaning was independently verified. Human/authorized agent review is still required for posting and duplicate decisions. Treat reversals, fees, own-account transfers, repeated notifications and balances carefully.
Financial integrity
Amounts use exact integer poisha. Shared user revisions reject stale new commands. Stored request receipts allow exact same-command replay after lost responses. Event external IDs protect delivery retries, and acceptance atomically links one event to one transaction. These mechanisms prevent specific accidental duplication; they do not prove that two independently submitted alerts describe different real-world purchases.
No success is shown before the database confirms the operation. An unknown result can already have committed; retry the same envelope. Database outages never justify replacing the saved workspace with an empty one. Error responses are sanitized and financial responses disable caching.
Deployment responsibilities
Protect database/network access, backups and secrets; configure trusted HTTPS origins; keep dependencies reviewed; configure your collector's authentication and request limits; and test restore procedures. TOTP, household roles, OAuth MCP discovery and encrypted provider-secret storage are not implemented features. See operations and coverage.
Profile and self-service security
Settings → Profile updates your display name. Email remains the administrator-managed sign-in identity; public registration, email-change/reset delivery, profile photos and household membership are not implemented. GET /api/v4/profile returns {revision,profile:{name,email,createdAt}}. POST takes {expectedRevision,requestId,command:{type:"profile_update",name}} and participates in the same shared revision/receipt protocol as finances.
Settings → Security changes the password (12–256 characters) or deliberately revokes every browser session and existing integration token. Both operations require your current password and invalidate the current session too; sign in again and create replacement integration tokens as needed. Passwords stay in the page's transient input state and are cleared after success; they are never placed in local storage or the URL.
POST /api/v4/security accepts {action:"password_change",currentPassword,newPassword} or {action:"sessions_revoke",currentPassword} and returns {signedOut:true} after commit. Browser session only; no bearer/MCP access. Failed current-password checks are rate limited after five attempts in a 15-minute window. This endpoint does not use financial request receipts: after a lost response and rejected session, sign in again to determine the result rather than assuming a replay confirmation.
Backup boundaries
Full backup export, validation and restore are browser-session-only at /api/v4/backup and its /validate and /restore endpoints. Restoration also requires the current password and a current shared revision. Current identity, passwords and token/session credentials are preserved; credentials are never imported. Financial/configuration replacement is atomic and existing request receipt tombstones are retained. Backup files may contain retained bank-message text and are readable JSON, not encrypted archives. See Full backup and restore.
This is public project documentation. Run the private application on your own server. View the source · Release notes.